Volume 111

Issue 3

Article 7

April 2009

Update: The Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered
Land Statutes - The Title Examination Ramifications
Robert Louis Shuman

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert L. Shuman, Update: The Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered Land Statutes - The
Title Examination Ramifications, 111 W. Va. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Shuman: Update: The Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered Land

UPDATE: THE AMENDED AND REENACTED
DELINQUENT AND NONENTERED LAND STATUTES
THE TITLE EXAMINATION RAMIFICATIONS
Robert Louis Shuman*
I.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................

II.

DECISIONS RELEVANT TO WEST VIRGINIA .........................................

HI.
IV .

707
708
A.
Rockland Realty Corp. v. Lilly ..............................................
708
B.
Rollyson v. Jordan .................................................................
711
C.
Mingo County Redevelopment Authority v. Green ............... 719
D.
Lexington Land Co. v. Howell ..............................................
723
E.
Subcarrier Communications, Inc. v. Nield ............................. 725
F.
Cogar v. Lafferty ....................................................................
731
G.
Plem ons v. G ale .....................................................................
731
H.
Jones v. Flow ers .....................................................................
744
ACTIONS TO SET ASIDE TAX DEEDS: FEE-SHIFrlNG AND
PUNITIVE D AM AGES ...........................................................................
749
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................
755

I. INTRODUCTION

During the summer preceding my third year of law school and the fall
semester of that year, at the suggestion and/or instigation of then-Professor,
soon to be Dean, and now once-again Professor John W. Fisher, II, I performed
the research for and prepared the preliminary draft of an article later entitled The
Amended and Reenacted Delinquent and Nonentered Land Statutes-The Title
ExaminationRamifications.' I co-authored the article with my late grandfather,
Robert Lemley Shuman, an icon among Monongalia County lawyers, who had
then been practicing law in the real property arena for over half a century.
A lot has transpired in the thirteen years since the publication of that
work. First, my grandfather did not actually live to see the work published; he
passed away early into the second semester of my third year. Second, a significant amount of material jurisprudence has been handed down from those five
*

I would like to expressly acknowledge the editorial assistance of Corey J. Powell, Esq., of

Morgantown; Steven M. Prunty, Esq., of Morgantown; Richard E. Ford, Jr., Esq., of Lewisburg;
Jonathan Nicol, Esq., of Charleston; H. Charles Carl, HI, Esq., of Romney; and Professor John W.
Fisher, II, Esq., in the preparation and discussion of this work.
Robert L. Shuman & Robert Louis Shuman, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 537 (1996).
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elevated seats behind the bench in Charleston in relation to "tax-sale" cases. 2
This work is an attempt to examine the more important of those decisions, in
chronological order based upon their issuance, as well as two recent federal decisions, and shed light on how they impact the practitioner in the course of examining, certifying, and/or insuring title to real property. In addition, this work
also explores, at its conclusion, some practical considerations for practitioners
challenging tax-sale deeds.
I1.DECISIONS RELEVANT TO WEST VIRGINIA

A.

Rockland Realty Corp. v. Lilly
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia issued a deci-

sion in a case styled Rockland Realty Corp. v. Lilly. 3 Rockland Realty Corpora-

tion ("Rockland") appealed a ruling by the circuit court holding West Virginia
Code § 11A-3-58 to be constitutional.4
Rockland was the owner of a shopping center known as Bluefield Plaza
in Mercer County, West Virginia.5 In late 1989, after Rockland failed to pay its
property taxes, the sheriff of Mercer County offered the tax lien encumbering
the shopping center for sale at a sheriff's sale to pay the delinquent taxes for the
1988 tax year. 6 The tax lien was not purchased at the sheriff's sale by any private party, so the sheriff acquired the tax lien on behalf of the State of West
Virginia.7 The State "held" the tax lien until 19948
In 1994, subsequent to the legislature's substantial amendment and reworking of the statutes relating to the sale of land for nonpayment of taxes and
non-entry on the tax rolls, the State Auditor "certified" the tax lien to the deputy
commissioner of delinquent and nonentered lands of Mercer County, who offered the tax lien for sale at another public auction. 9 Again, there was no purchaser.' 0 Subsequently, under the authority of West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-48,
the deputy commissioner sought out a private purchaser for the tax lien encumbering Rockland's property." The deputy commissioner entered into an agree2

"We use the term 'tax-sale' as shorthand for the entire process whereby a sheriff or the

Auditor sells at auction a property on which no one has paid the real property taxes." Mingo
County Redevelopment Auth. v. Green, 534 S.E.2d 40, 42 n. 1 (W. Va. 2000).
3
487 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1997).
4
Id. at 333.
5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8
9

Id. at 333-34.
Id.

10

I

Id.
I ld.
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ment with a private party whereby the deputy commissioner agreed that if the
applicable tax lien was not redeemed by Rockland then the deputy commissioner would sell and grant the property to the purchaser for $100,000.00.12 A
notice advising Rockland of its right of redemption was then mailed to and received by Rockland.13 The notice indicated that payment of the amount of
$602,167.63 was required
to redeem the delinquent taxes and cover associated
4
costs and interest.1
5
Rockland filed suit to enjoin the sale by the deputy commissioner.'
The circuit court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the sale with the
condition that the injunction would automatically expire on December 15, 1994,
unless Rockland paid the redemption amount to the clerk of the circuit court as a
bond prior to such date. 16 Rockland failed to make the payment, the injunction
terminated, and the deputy commissioner
delivered a deed transferring the
17
shopping center to the purchaser.
On appeal, Rockland asserted that West Virginia Code § 11A-3-58 was
unconstitutional on the basis that it mandated that moneys paid to redeem delinquent property taxes were to be paid to the purchaser of the tax lien, and not to
the State for use in the general school fund.' 8 At that time, West Virginia Code
§ 11A-3-58 stated:
(a) Where the land has been redeemed.., and the deputy commissioner has delivered the redemption money to the sheriff...
the sheriff shall, upon request made of him by the purchaser...
and upon delivery to the sheriff of the purchaser's receipt for
the sale, pay to the purchaser... the following amounts: (1) ...

(B) the amount of taxes, interest and charges due on the date of
the sale, plus the interest at the rate of one percent per month
from the date of sale to the date of redemption ...19
Rockland argued that since the purchaser had only paid $100,000.00 for
the tax lien it purchased, the above-referenced statute mandated that the purchaser would receive
a windfall of $502,167.63 that should be deposited into the
"school fund.",20 In addressing this argument, the court began by pointing out

12

Id.

13

19

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-58 (1994)).

20

Id. at 335.

14
15
16
17
18
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what it noted as "two critical facts.",2 1 The first was that West Virginia Code
§ 1 IA-3-58 was "substantially revised by the Legislature in 1995.22 The second was that Rockland never attempted to avail itself of the redemption procedures it was challenging. 23 That is, Rockland, in the six years after it failed to
pay its 1988 taxes, did not attempt to eliminate the delinquency. 24 Furthermore,
the court also noted that even after Rockland challenged the constitutionality of
the statute, it still failed, as required by the circuit court, to post a bond in the
amount of the delinquency.2 5 The court went through a brief discussion of the
precedent relative to addressing the constitutionality of statutes and then concluded its discussion by determining that Rockland's issue of constitutionality
was a moot question in that Rockland 26was seeking to invalidate a statute of
which it had not attempted to avail itself.

For the purposes of this Article, the significance of Rockland is that the
court did not even consider sua sponte whether the use of a private sale by the
deputy commissioner was a constitutionally valid mechanism. In footnote two
of the decision, the court noted that Rockland made "repeated allusions" as to
the impropriety of a privately negotiated sale versus a public auction, especially
one where the negotiated price was more than half a million dollars less than the
outstanding tax delinquency. 27 In addressing such "repeated allusions," the
court simply acknowledged an interpretation of the Attorney General as to the
statute's intent: "the statute commendably allows delinquent properties to be
placed into the hands of responsible taxpayers, rather than languish on the tax
rolls.,

28

However, in the following footnote, the court also expressly acknowl-

edged that Rockland had not challenged the statute, West Virginia Code § 11 A3-48, authorizing the deputy commissioner to effect a private disposition. 29 As a
result, if anything useful can be gleaned by a practitioner from Rockland, it is
that the efficacy of challenging a private sale of a tax lien by a deputy commissioner has not been completely foreclosed by the court and a title examiner
should conspicuously disclose such fact to any prospective purchaser he or she
might represent.3 °
21

Id.

22

Id.
Id.
Id.

23
24

25
26
27
28
29

30

Id.
Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 335 n.2.
Id.
Id. at n.3.
West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-48 (2000) provides as follows:
If any of the lands which have been offered for sale at the public auction provided in section forty-five of this article shall remain unsold following such
auction, or if the auditor refuses to approve the sale pursuant to section fiftyone of this article, the deputy commissioner may sell such lands at any time

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/7

4

Shuman: Update:
The Amended
Reenacted Delinquent
and Nonentered Land
DELINQUENT
AND and
NONENTERED
LAND STATUTES
20091

B.

Rollyson v. Jordan

Next, the court rendered an opinion in a case styled Rollyson v. Jordan.3' The appellants, Jack L. Sears, Julia Ann Chapman, and Charlotte Jo
Sears ("Sears Heirs"), appealed (a) an order of the circuit court which granted
Robert Rollyson ("Rollyson") mandamus relief, and (b) a subsequent order
which denied the Sears Heirs' motion to alter or amend the circuit court's earlier
order."

Rollyson purchased a tax lien encumbering certain property at a tax-sale
held by the Braxton County Sheriff.33 The tax lien had been offered for sale as a
result of the nonpayment of real property taxes by the property's owner, Nix
Mining Company ("Nix"). 34 Following his purchase, Rollyson filed a notice list
with the clerk as required by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 11A-319(a)(1). The list identified those parties who were entitled to receive notice of
their right to redeem the tax lien before the issuance of a tax deed to Rollyson.35
Rollyson reported to the clerk that the only party entitled to notice of its right to
redeem was Nix.36 After the notice to Nix was returned as not forwardable, the
clerk requested that Rollyson notify Nix of its right to redeem by publication.3 7
As a result, Rollyson caused a notice advising Nix of its right to redeem to be
published in two local newspapers.3
Nix failed to redeem the tax lien within the appropriate timeframe.39
However, on March 31, 1997, the final day of the redemption period, Rollyson's
counsel discovered that additional parties also possessed an interest in the property. 4 ° Carl Sears and Irene Sears had held a promissory note secured by a deed
of trust encumbering the property.'" As a result of various dispositions, the
holders of the note, or at least purported holders of the note, at the time of Rollyson's discovery were Irene Sears, who held at least a one-half (1/2) interest in

34

subsequent to such auction, without any further public auction or additional
advertising of such land, to any party willing to purchase such property. The
price of such property shall be as agreed upon by the deputy commissioner
and purchaser, subject to approval by the auditor as provided in section fiftyone of this article.
518 S.E.2d 372 (W. Va. 1999).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

31
32

33
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the note, and the Sears Heirs.4 2 Rollyson's counsel notified the clerk of such
discovery and the existence of the lienholders and requested guidance as to how
to proceed
given the prior lack of notice to the lienholders of their right to re43
deem.
The clerk advised Rollyson to institute a mandamus action to obtain the
preparation, execution, and filing of a tax deed in relation to the property. 44
Although Rollyson proposed providing the lienholders with notice of their right
to redeem, the clerk refused to issue any additional notices. 45 As a result, Rollyson contacted Irene Sears and notified her of his tax lien purchase. 46 Subsequently,
Irene Sears assigned her one-half (1/2) interest in the note to Rolly47
son.

The Sears Heirs, however, once notified of their right to redeem by Rollyson's wife, refused to relinquish their purported one-half (1/2) interest in the
note. 48 Furthermore, in late April or early May 1997, the Sears Heirs even attempted to redeem the tax lien for the amount of the delinquent property taxes. 49
However, the clerk refused to accept their proffered redemption.50
In August 1997, Rollyson instituted a mandamus action requesting the
circuit court to compel the clerk to execute a tax deed identifying him as the
new owner of the property.51 The Sears Heirs opposed the action.52 The circuit
court found, in part, that Rollyson had substantially complied with the notice
provisions of West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-19(a)(1); that the Sears Heirs, by
virtue of their status as lienholders, were not entitled to the ownership of the
property, and that Rollyson should be permitted to pay the balance due and owing on the note held by the Sears Heirs.53 The Sears Heirs subsequently moved
to alter 54
or amend the order of the circuit court and the circuit court denied their

motion.

In analyzing the appeal and discussing its rationale, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals first attempted to determine whether the Sears Heirs
should have been afforded an opportunity to redeem the tax lien. 55 The court
42

Id. at 375-76.

43

Id. at 376.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48
49

Id.
Id.

50

Id.

51

53

Id.
Id.
Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

52
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noted that West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-19 requires a party who has purchased a
tax lien at a tax-sale to complete certain prerequisites before he or she may obtain a deed to such property. 56 Among these requirements is the preparation of a
list of those to be served with notice of their right to redeem. 57 The court stated
that there was some difficulty, "however, in discerning precisely who is entitled
to this 'notice to redeem[,]"' and that a "survey of both this statutory provision
and the other sections comprising this body of law, concerning the 'Sale of Tax
Liens and Nonentered, Escheated and Waste and Unappropriated Lands,' fails
to reveal a precise designation of the intended recipients of such notice. 5 8 After
looking to West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-23(a) for guidance, the court stated that
Impliedly, then, those persons who have a right to redeem property which has been sold at a tax sale must be the same individuals who are entitled to receive notice to redeem in connection with the purchaser's application for a tax deed, as contemplated by W. Va. Code § 1 A-3-19(a)(1). Were this not the
case, an individual's right to redeem, without the statutory notice designed to safeguard such right, would be virtually meaningless and illusory. Accordingly, we hold that the persons entitled to notice to redeem in conjunction with a purchaser's application for a tax deed, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 1 lA-319(a)(1), are those persons who are permitted to redeem the real
property subject to a tax lien or liens, as contemplated by W.
Va. Code § 11A-3-23(a), which persons include 'the owner' of
such property and 'any other person who was entitled to pay the
taxes' thereon.59
The court then went through a rather protracted analysis that focused on
a provision of the deed of trust encumbering the property that afforded the secured party thereunder the right to pay and redeem delinquent taxes. 60 Based on
this provision in the deed of trust, and presumably only because of this express
provision, the court concluded that the Sears Heirs, because they were parties
who were entitled to pay the taxes, in reference to the applicable provision of
West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-23(a), were likewise parties entitled to notice of
their right to redeem.6'
While I concur with the conclusion, I do not agree with the avenue traveled to get there. The seminal case in modern tax-sale jurisprudence is the deci56

Id. at 378.

57

Id.; W. VA. CODE § 1 1A-3-19(a)(2) (1998).

58

Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 378 (internal citations omitted).

59

Id. at 378-79 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 380.

60
61
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sion rendered in Lilly v. Duke.62 In Lilly, the very issue confronted by the court
was "whether a property owner or a mortgagee may be deprived of his property
interest without adequate notice prior to the sale of property at a sheriff's sale
for failure to pay taxes. 63 While the focus and facts in Lilly were different from
those in Rollyson, and while Lilly was decided before and was actually the impetus behind the 1994 amendment and reenactment of the tax-sale scheme, Lilly
clearly and definitively stands for the proposition that a lienholder, especially a
secured party under a deed of trust, is a party entitled to notice in just those
types of circumstances involved in Rollyson. In fact, Lilly focused on whether a
secured party under a deed of trust was entitled to notice prior to disposition of a
tax lien at a sheriff's sale, as opposed to whether such a secured party is entitled
to notice at the final stages of the tax-sale process, where the right to redeem the
tax lien will be forfeited and the property effectively foreclosed upon by enforcement of the tax lien. 64 In analyzing the facts and due process issues in
Lilly, the court stated as follows:
Two conclusions may be drawn from Mennonite and Pope.
First, as with the mortgagee in Mennonite, the beneficiary of a
deed of trust enjoys a protectable interest in the property subject
to the trust. We have recognized the substantial property interests involved in a deed of trust-the trustee holding legal title
for the beneficiary and the grantor holding an equitable title.
Second, these cases prescribe certain constitutional due process
requirements for notice of a tax sale of real property. Where a
party having an interest in the property can reasonably be identified from public records or otherwise, due process requires
that such party be provided notice by mail or other means as
65
certain to ensure actual notice ....
As a result, Lilly had already decided the question of whether the Sears
Heirs were entitled to notice to redeem. Furthermore, examining the deed of
trust itself, for the purpose of determining whether the secured party expressly
reserved or retained the right to pay delinquent taxes and/or redeem the same,
was a severely flawed point of focus in determining whether the secured party
has the right to pay the taxes associated with its security. Generally speaking,
the cases, state and federal, that address the issue of whether a party is entitled
to notice, whether the notice is a preliminary notice of the potential disposition
of the tax lien or a subsequent notice dealing with the forfeiture or foreclosure
62

63

376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at 124.

64 Id.
65

Id. at 125 (internal citations omitted).
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of the property itself, approach the notice issue from the standpoint that an interest in the property encumbered by the tax lien, regardless of the nature,
whether it be an "ownership" or equity interest or a lien or security interest, entitles its holder to notice. This standpoint presumes, and inherently implies, that
the holder of an interest in the subject property has coupled with the interest the
right to protect his investment and/or security from forfeiture. Furthermore,
West Virginia Code § 11A-3-2(b) acknowledges this in the context of lienholders when it requires the sheriff to send a pre-sheriff's sale notice to each lienholder that has filed a statement referenced in West Virginia Code § 1 1A-3-3.66
66

West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-2(b) (1995) provides as follows:

(b) In addition to such publication, no less than thirty days prior to the sale,
the sheriff shall send a notice of the delinquency and the date of sale by certified mail: (1) To the last known address of each person listed in the land
books whose taxes are delinquent; (2) to each person having a lien on real
property upon which the taxes are due as disclosed by a statement filed with
the sheriff pursuant to the provisions of section three of this article; (3) to each
other person with an interest in the property or with a fiduciary relationship to
a person with an interest in the property who has in writing delivered to the
sheriff on a form prescribed by the Tax Commissioner a request for such notice of delinquency; and (4) in the case of property which includes a mineral
interest but does not include an interest in the surface other than an interest for
the purpose of developing the minerals, to each person who has in writing delivered to the sheriff, on a form prescribed by the Tax Commissioner, a request for such notice which identifies the person as an owner of an interest in
the surface of real property that is included in the boundaries of such property:
Provided, That in a case where one owner owns more than one parcel of real
property upon which taxes are delinquent, the sheriff may, at his or her option,
mail separate notices to the owner and each lienholder for each parcel or may
prepare and mail to the owner and each lienholder a single notice which pertains to all such delinquent parcels. If the sheriff elects to mail only one notice, that notice shall set forth a legally sufficient description of all parcels of
property on which taxes are delinquent. In no event shall failure to receive the
mailed notice by the landowner or lienholder affect the validity of the title of
the property conveyed if it is conveyed pursuant to section twenty-seven or
fifty-nine of this article.
West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-3 (1995) provides as follows:
(a) Any person claiming a lien against real property shall be deemed to have
waived the right to notice provided by section two of this article unless he
shall have filed a statement declaring such interest with the sheriff. Such
statement shall be filed upon creation of the lien and upon release of said lien
and upon any change of the lienholder's postal address since the original filing
of such statement.
Such statement shall be sufficient if it is filed at the time the document creating the lien is filed and when said lien is released on a form and in a manner to
be prescribed from time to time by the tax commissioner, which form shall include the name of the person charged with taxes for the real property; the tax
map and parcel number of the property; the assessor's account number of the
property; a description of the interest claimed; and the address to which notice
is to be sent: Provided, That it shall be sufficient for purposes of this section if
the information required by this section is provided on a sales listing form
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In addition, such an analysis is conspicuously absent from other decisions involving the rights of lienholders to notice. 67 Therefore, the Rollyson analysis is
off-base to the extent that it appears to gear a security interest holder's right to
pay or redeem taxes associated with its security to the express retention or reservation of such right in the deed of trust or mortgage.
I also take issue with another aspect of Rollyson. In assessing the case,
the court noted that
Rollyson ha[d] effectively become bound by the terms of the
deed of trust note as the sale of property subject to a tax lien
does not, automatically, relieve the property of its other debt(s)
since the purchaser can acquire only the same character of title
as that held by those individuals who were entitled to redeem
the property. Thus, when property subject to a deed of trust is
sold for the recoupment of delinquent taxes, the property continues to retain its posture as security for the deed of trust note.
Therefore, when Rollyson purchased the subject property at the
sheriff's sale, he purchased indirectly from the property's prior
owner, Nix, and thus stepped into Nix's shoes for the purpose
of removing the property's tax encumbrance. However, the
65.25 acre tract continues to be encumbered by the deed of trust
and to provide security for the deed68of trust note in which the
Sears Heirs claim a one-half interest.
It is the second sentence of such statement that is challenging, in that it
is set forth as simple, axiomatic black-letter law.69 In reaching this conclusion,
prescribed in section six, article twenty-two, chapter eleven of this code and
filed with the clerk of the county commission at the time of the filing of the
document. The statement may be amended at any time by the person claiming
the lien, upon such amended form and in such manner as may be prescribed
by the tax commissioner: Provided, however, That in counties with a population greater than two hundred thousand any person claiming liens against
more than fifty parcels of real estate may file such statement electronically in
a similar format as before described designed by the tax commissioner.
(b) At least once a year prior to the first day of July, the sheriff shall publish a notice that any person claiming a lien against taxable real property must
file the statement required by this section or such person will be deemed to
have waived any right to notice provided by the preceding section. The notice
shall be published as a Class I legal advertisement in compliance with the
provisions of article three, chapter fifty-nine of this code, and the publication
area for such publication shall be the county in which such land is located.
67
See Lilly, 376 S.E.2d 122; Citizens Nat'l Bank of St. Albans v. Dunnaway, 400 S.E.2d 888
(W. Va. 1990).
68
Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 379-80 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
69
This concerning statement or recitation of the law is not summarized in any of the syllabus
points of Rollyson.
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the court cited and quoted, among others, two precedents. First, the court cited
Bennett v. Neff 70 for the proposition that "[w]hen the purchaser of any real estate sold at a tax sale obtains a deed for such real estate from the clerk of the
county court he acquires all the right, title and interest therein that were, at the
time of the execution and delivery of the deed, vested in or held by any person
who was entitled to redeem., 71 Second, the court cited Syllabus Point 2 of
Summers v. Kanawha County72 for the following proposition:
If at the time of [a tax-] sale the land sold be under a mortgage
or deed of trust, or if there be any other lien or incumbrance
thereon, and such mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, lienor or
incumbrancer shall fail to redeem the same within the time prescribed by law, then all the right, title and interest of such mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, lienor or incumbrancer, shall
pass to and be vested in the purchaser at such tax-sale, and his
title to the premises shall in no way be affected or impaired by
such mortgage, deed of trust, lien or incumbrance.7 3
Both precedents are actually codified in West Virginia Code § 1 1A-330, which provides, in applicable part, as follows:
(a) Whenever the purchaser of any tax lien on any real estate
sold at a tax sale, his heirs or assigns shall have obtained a deed
for such real estate from the clerk of the county commission or
from a commissioner appointed to make the deed, he or they
shall thereby acquire all such right, title and interest, in and to
the real estate, as was, at the time of the execution and delivery
of the deed, vested in or held by any person who was entitled to
redeem, unless such person is one who, being required by law
to have his interest separately assessed and taxed, has done so
and has paid all the taxes due thereon, or unless the rights of
such person are expressly saved by the provisions of section six
of this article or section two, three, four or six, article four of
this chapter.
The tax deed shall be conclusive evidence of the acquisition of
such title. The title so acquired shall relate back to July first of

70
71

42 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1947).
Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 379 (citing Bennett v. Neff, 42 S.E.2d 793, 805 (W. Va. 1947))

(emphasis added).
72
26 W. Va. 159 (1885).
73 Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 381 (citing Syl. Pt. 2, Summers, 26 W. Va. 159).
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the year in which the taxes, for nonpayment of which the tax
lien on the real estate was sold, were assessed.
By inserting the above language in the decision, the court ventured
down a path that need not have been traveled and that it failed to follow to its
conclusion. It is submitted that if a secured party under a deed of trust is a party
entitled to redeem the tax lien sold at the tax-sale and the statute clearly states
that the purchaser acquires "all such right, title and interest, in and to the real
estate, as was, at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed, vested in or
held by any person who was entitled to redeem,"75 then, the purchaser of the tax
lien, assuming all applicable notices were provided, does not acquire the property by way of a deed from the county clerk subject to the lien of a deed of trust
encumbering the property, but free and clear of the same as a result of not only
acquiring the "owner's" interest but also the lienholder's interest by virtue of
such statute. Therefore, the Rollyson court, since it commenced down the path
to discuss the topic, which was not really relevant to the discussion, should have
taken the discussion to its conclusion and noted that had the Sears Heirs received notice of their right to redeem and not redeemed the tax lien, then their
security interest in the property would have been foreclosed and passed on to
Rollyson along with the interest of Nix.
Footnote 11 of Rollyson is also important. The clerk asserted that the
Sears Heirs had waived their right to receive notice of their right to redeem because they failed to file with the sheriff a notice of their lienholder interest in the
property as provided for in West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-3.76 While the court
found no evidence on the record that the Sears Heirs had filed such a lienholder
statement, it also found that the failure to file the same was not fatal to their
case. 77 The court determined that the provisions of West Virginia Code § 1 A3-3 pertain to a very limited notice scheme designed to inform lienholders of
impending sales of tax liens encumbering property which have become delinquent. 78 It also concluded in the footnote that there are no statutory provisions
requiring a lienholder to file such a statement as a prerequisite to receiving notice of its redemption rights, and therefore, the failure to file a lienholder statement contemplated by West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-3 has no bearing or prejudice on a lienholder's right to receive notice of its right to redeem.79

74

W. VA. CODE § I IA-3-30 (1994) (emphasis added).

75

Id. (emphasis added).

76

Rollyson, 518 S.E.2d at 380 n.1 1.

77

Id.
Id.
See also supra note 66 (reprinting W. VA.

78

79

CODE §§ I IA-3-2(b) & 1 A-3-3).
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Mingo County Redevelopment Authority v. Green

C.

Mingo County Redevelopment Authority v. Green8 ° resulted from a
competition between the State Auditor and the Mingo County Redevelopment
Authority ("Redevelopment Authority"). 8' The case evolved from the collision
action by the Redevelopment Authority and a tax-sale by the
of a condemnation
2
Auditor.8
Irene Green owned an interest in property located in Mingo County.83
She died intestate, leaving several heirs, none of which paid the property taxes
for several years. 84 The Redevelopment Authority decided to acquire the property for development as a housing project and filed a condemnation proceeding.5 The Redevelopment Authority served its condemnation complaint on the
Mingo County Sheriff.86 However, it did not file a notice of lis pendens with
87
the county clerk in relation to the condemnation action.
During the course of the condemnation action, the tax lien encumbering
the property was offered for sale at a sheriffs sale as a result of non-payment.88
No one purchased the tax lien at the sheriffs sale, so the sheriff "certified" the
property to the Auditor.8 9 Subsequently, counsel for the Redevelopment Authority contacted an employee of the Auditor's office. 90 That same employee of
the Auditor's office later faxed to counsel for the Redevelopment Authority a
detailed description of the taxes and fees then owing on the property. 91 However, the taxes remained unpaid and delinquent and ultimately, the auditor's
agent, the Mingo County deputy commissioner of delinquent and nonentered
lands, sold the tax lien at auction to Vida Maynard.92
Subsequent to the deputy commissioner's sale and prior to the issuance
and delivery of a deed, the Auditor's office notified the Green heirs of the sale
and of the amount they would have to pay to redeem the taxes in order to pre93
vent the deputy commissioner from delivering a deed to the purchaser.
Meanwhile, the circuit court entered an order approving the payment by the
81

534 S.E.2d 40 (W. Va. 2000).
Id. at 42.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84
85

Id.
Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 43.

89

Id.

90
92

Id.
Id.
Id.

93

Id.

80

91
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Redevelopment Authority of money into the court and granting the Redevelopment Authority "immediate possession" of the property. 94 The tax-sale process
and the condemnation process collided when the deputy commissioner granted
the property to Vida Maynard's assignee, Maggie Harmon.9 5 Within the context
of its already pending condemnation action, the Redevelopment Authority
moved the circuit court to set aside the tax deed to Ms. Harmon.96 The circuit
court determined that the Auditor should have provided the Redevelopment
Authority with notice of the tax-sale and issued an order granting the Redevelopment Authority's motion to set aside the tax deed, by which it voided the deed
to Ms. Harmon and ordered any consideration paid at the tax sale to be returned
to the purchaser. 97 The Auditor appealed.9 8
On appeal, the Redevelopment Authority claimed that both the Auditor
and the sheriff had actual or constructive notice of the Redevelopment Authority's claim to the property and that as a result of this notice they should have
halted the tax-sale 4 process and allowed the Redevelopment Authority to condemn the property.99
In assessing the facts and applicable law, the court first recognized "that
this area of the law ha[d] undergone significant change in the last several years,
with each change increasing the protections afforded the delinquent land owner.' ° The court then turned to an analysis of a sheriff's duties under the taxsale statutes.' 0' After examining such duties, the court found it to be important
and relevant that the Redevelopment Authority had not filed with the sheriff the
statement or notice form contemplated by the provisions of West Virginia Code
§ 11A-3-2, which is the same notice form discussed above in relation to footnote eleven of Rollyson.1°2 The court noted that even though the Redevelopment Authority had served the sheriff with a copy of the original complaint in
the condemnation action, there was no evidence that the Redevelopment Authority had attempted to use the statutorily mandated
method of providing notice
10 3
to the sheriff of its asserted interest in the property.
Because the sheriff's sale did not result in a disposition of the property
into private hands, but rather, a "certification" to the Auditor, the court then
94

Id.

95
96

Id.
Id.

97

Id. at44.

98

Id.
Id. at 44-45.
100
Id. at 45 (emphasis added). As will be noted infra, this policy statement or recognition is a
significant point that should be brought to the attention of circuit courts in prosecuting actions to
invalidate or set aside tax-sale deeds.
'01 Id. at 46-47.
99

102 Supra note 66, 77-79 and accompanying text.
103

Green, 534 S.E.2d at 47.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/7

14

The Amended
and ReenactedLAND
Delinquent
and Nonentered Land
2009]Shuman: Update:
STATUTES
AND NONENTERED
DELINQUENT

turned its focus on the Auditor's and deputy commissioner's roles in the tax-sale
process.1 °4 The court noted that even after a deputy commissioner-spFonsored
tax-sale, the owner still has an opportunity to redeem the tax lien.' 0 Citing
West Virginia Code § 11A-3-52(a), the court noted that a purchaser at a tax-sale
conducted by a deputy commissioner has an obligation to identify those parties
entitled to redeem the tax lien before the purchaser can receive a deed relative to
the property. °6 Then, similar to the function of a county clerk under the provisions of Part I of Article 3 of Chapter 11 A, the deputy commissioner takes the
purchaser's list and issues the requisite notices in relation to the right to redeem. 107
Essentially, the court was revisiting at least part of the issue addressed
in Rollyson. 10 8 That is, the court was asked to focus on whether the Redevelopment Authority had an interest in the property by virtue of its prosecution of the
condemnation action and its procurement of an order granting it possession,
which interest afforded the Redevelopment Authority the opportunity to redeem
the tax lien, and if such an interest and right existed, had it been properly evidenced of record so that the tax lien purchaser was obligated to notify the deputy commissioner that the Redevelopment Authority was entitled to notice of its
right to redeem. 1 9 In framing this query, the court first declared that the only
way the Redevelopment Authority could successfully challenge the execution
and delivery of the tax deed to the purchaser was to show that the Redevelopment Authority should have been identified on the list of those to be served with
notice of their right to redeem prepared pursuant to West Virginia Code § 11A3-52. 0 Next, it was noted that as of the time of the deputy commissioner's
sale, the Redevelopment Authority had not placed constructive notice of its
"standing" of record by filing a notice of lis pendens in the county clerk's office,
nor had it served the Auditor or deputy commissioner with the complaint in the
condemnation action."'
The court then turned to the Redevelopment Authority's argument that
either the phone calls and letters exchanged between counsel for the Redevelopment Authority and an employee of the Auditor's office or the communications between the Redevelopment Authority and the State Department of Tax
and Revenue were sufficient, in lieu of proper notice to the Auditor or proper
recordation of a notice of lis pendens. 1 2 In responding to such argument, the
104

105

Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.

109

Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-52(a) (1995)).
Id. at 48-49 (citing W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-55 (1995)).
Rollyson v. Jordan, 518 S.E.2d 372 (W. Va. 1999).
Mingo County Redevelopment Auth. v. Green, 534 S.E.2d 40,44-45 (W. Va. 2000).

11o

Id.at 49.

III

Id.

112

Id.

106
107
108
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court bluntly stated that such telephone calls and written communications could
not
equate ... with filing proper notice in the courthouse or properly serving the Auditor with a complaint in the condemnation
action. While this might have been, and probably was, sufficient to give the Authority actual knowledge of the pendency of
the tax collection process, it was not sufficient to convert the
Authority into an
entity entitled to service of formal notice un3
1
statute."
the
der
The court then correctly went on to focus on what knowledge the tax
lien purchaser at the deputy commissioner's sale would have of the Redevelopment Authority's interest in the property:
A purchaser of the property at the Auditor's sale is required to
assemble a list of parties who hold some interest in the property.
The purchaser must make a diligent search of public records to
identify interested parties. If we allow a call to the office to
equal notice, then we place upon the Auditor (and presumably
every sheriff) the near impossible burden of creating a duplicate
system of recordation of property interests for "people who
called in," which the purchaser would also have to 1 14
search to
find additional interested parties. This we will not do.
Of important note in the above discussion is the fact that the court did
not expand its notion of "public records" to include those beyond the records
contained in the sheriffs tax office and the county clerk's office. That is, while
there had been no notice of lis pendens filed in the county clerk's office, obviously the complaint in the condemnation action had been filed in the circuit
clerk's office, a public office in the very same courthouse. By implication, the
court rejected the circuit clerk's office as a repository of "public records" that a
tax lien purchaser must search in the course of exercising due diligence.
The court also stated that it was not in agreement with the contention
that the Redevelopment Authority's communications with the Department of
Tax and Revenue constituted any sort of notice to the Auditor. 1 5 The court
stated that
[a]s the Department correctly informed counsel for the Redevelopment Authority, there is no direct or departmental connec113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.
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tion between the offices. We are not inclined to find that communicating with the Department of Tax and Revenue is the leor
gal or practical equivalent of service of notice on the Auditor,
11 6
can in any way affect the Auditor's sale of the property.
D.

Lexington Land Co. v. Howell

Lexington Land Co. v. Howell" 7 was the next decision in chronological
order. It resulted from an appeal of an order granting a writ of mandamus.1 8
Lexington Land Company, LLC ("Lexington"), purchased several properties at a sale conducted by a deputy commissioner." 9 The deputy commissioner subsequently issued deeds relative to the properties and Lexington recorded the deeds. 20 Subsequent to recording the deeds, Lexington or its agent
filed a so-called "Certificate of Attorney-at-Law" concerning several of the
properties, notifying the deputy commissioner that each property was either "the
subject of an erroneous assessment, or is otherwise nonexistent."' 121 In response,
the deputy commissioner and the State Auditor's office informed Lexington that
a refund of the purchase money could not be obtained after the deeds had been
issued.1 22 Lexington then contacted the Kanawha County Sheriff's Office and
inquired about obtaining a refund of the purchase money. 123 The sheriff responded that because a deed had already been recorded for each property, "it is
the Sheriff s position that West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-53 had no further application and there is nothing the Sheriff can do to resolve your problem."' 124 As a
result of these several denials of its request for a refund, Lexington filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against both the sheriff and the county clerk seeking reimbursement. 25 The sheriff and county clerk were subsequently dismissed from the action, and Lexington was granted leave to amend its petition. 126 Thereafter, Lexington filed an amended petition, naming only the deputy commissioner as a respondent. 27 In relation to the amended petition, the

116

Id.

117

567 S.E.2d 654 (W. Va. 2002).

"1

Id. at 656.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.
Id.
Id.

123
124

126

Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 657.

127

Id.

12
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circuit court entered an order granting
the writ and directing the deputy commis128
sioner to refund the purchase money.
In framing its discussion, the court stated that the "cynosure of this case
is the lower court's interpretation of the statute that governs when a party may
receive a refund when it is discovered that property purchased at a Deputy
Commissioner's sale is nonexistent or erroneously assessed.' ' 129 The court then
noted that at the time of the events in question, the operative statute, West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-53 read as follows:
If, after payment of the amount bid at a deputy commissioner's
sale, the purchaser discovers that the property purchased at such
sale is the subject of an erroneous assessment or is otherwise
nonexistent, such purchaser shall submit the certificate of an attorney-at-law that the property is the subject of an erroneous assessment or is otherwise nonexistent. Upon receipt thereof, the
deputy commissioner shall cause the moneys so paid to be refunded. Upon refund, the deputy commissioner shall inform the
assessor of the erroneous assessment for the purpose of having
the assessor correct said error. 3 °
Lexington argued that this section contained no time limit for the submission of the "certificate" and that once a certificate was submitted the deputy
commissioner had no option but to refund the purchase money. 13 1 The deputy
commissioner countered that the Legislature had not defined the terms "erroneous assessment," "non-existent," or "certificate of attorney-at-law.' ' 32 The deputy commissioner also contended that the Legislature had not expressly granted
the deputy commissioner the authority to command the sheriff to refund the
purchase money in such circumstances.1 33 Furthermore, the deputy commissioner argued that inherent or implied in the statute was the actual intent of the
Legislature to mean: "If, after payment of the amount bid but before the deputy
commissioner issues a deed.., such purchaser shall submit a certificate ....
In responding to these competing arguments, the court looked to the
plain and simple language of the statute in effect at the time of the occurrences
in play and the absence of a timeframe in that language. 135 It also looked to the
fact that the Legislature reworked the statute in 2001 to read as follows:

130

Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-53 (1994)).

131

Id.

132

Id.

128

129

133 Id.
134

Id. (emphasis in original).

135 Id. at 660.
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If, within forty-five days following the approval of the sale by
the auditor, the purchaser discovers that the property purchased
at the sale is nonexistent, the purchaser shall submit the abstract
or certificate of an attorney-at-law that the property is nonexistent. Upon receipt of the abstract or certificate, the deputy
commissioner shall cause the moneys so paid to be refunded.
Upon refund of the amount bid at a deputy commissioner's sale,
the deputy commissioner shall inform the assessor that the
property does not exist for the purpose of having the assessor
correct the error. For failure to meet this requirement, the purchaser shall lose all benefits of his purchase.
With this look, the court stated that the "presence of this time limit in
the new version throws in to sharp relief the absence of any time limit in the old
version."' 137 And, as a result, the court concurred with the circuit court and concluded that Lexington had "complied with the dictates of the statute at the time.
. [and]
had a clear legal right to a refund... under the prior version of the stat138
ute."
The primary function of including Lexington in this work is to draw attention to the fact that West Virginia Code § 11A-3-53 obligates the tax lien
purchaser to examine title to the property at issue within forty-five (45) days
following the approval of the sale of the tax lien by the Auditor and to notify
either the deputy commissioner or Auditor, it is not clear which, within that
timeframe of the property's "non-existence" by way of an abstract or certificate
from its counsel.
E.

Subcarrier Communications, Inc. v. Nield

Subcarrier Communications, Inc. v. Nield139 was the next decision rendered by the court. In November, 1996, Subcarrier purchased property from
Skyline Communications, Ltd., located in Preston County.14° The deed evidencing the property transfer was placed of record and the appended sales listing
form correctly identified Subcarrier's corporate address as 101 Eisenhower
Parkway, Roseland, New Jersey.14 ' In September, 1997, Subcarrier relocated its
office to 139 White Oak Lane, Old Bridge, New Jersey, and by correspondence

136 Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-53 (2001)).
137
138

Id. (emphasis in original).

139

624 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 2005).
Id. at 731.

141

141

Id. at 661.

Id.
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dated November 25, 1997, notified42the Preston County Clerk of its change of
address and current phone number.
In May 1998, when the 1997 property taxes for the property had not
been paid, the Preston County Sheriff mailed a notice of delinquency to Subcarrier at its former, Roseland, New Jersey address. 43 A postal forwarding order
44
was in effect at that time, so Subcarrier received the notice at its new address.'
Subcarrier responded to the notice by tendering a check in the proper amount
and enclosing a letter with the check advising the sheriff of Subcarrier's new
address. 45 Additionally, the check
tendered in payment of the delinquent taxes
146
bore Subcarrier's new address.
When property tax statements were issued for the 1998 tax year, the
sheriff once again mailed Subcarrier's statement to its old Roseland, New Jersey
address. 147 Then, in September 1998, the sheriff mailed a notice of delinquency
due to Subcarrier's failure to pay the 1998 property taxes. 148 As before, the sheriff mailed the notice to Subcarrier's old Roseland, New Jersey address. 149 By
this time, the postal forwarding order had expired and the notice of delinquency
was returned to the sheriffs office with a stamp stating "[u]ndeliverable,
[f]orwarding order expired. ' 5 °
On November 15, 1999, a tax-sale was conducted by the Preston County Sheriff.' 5 ' Patrick Nield, then the Sheriff of Mineral County ("Sheriff
52
Nield"), purchased the tax lien encumbering the property at the sheriffs sale.
Thereafter, in late 2000, Sheriff Nield engaged counsel to research the title to
the property
and to assist Sheriff Nield in obtaining a tax deed as to the prop153
erty.

One of the requirements for obtaining a tax deed is to provide notice of
the right to redeem pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 1 A-3-19, 1 A-3-21, and
11 A-3-22. To facilitate proper notice to Subcarrier, Sheriff Nield contacted the
West Virginia Secretary of State's office to obtain Subcarrier's current mailing
address.' 54 The only address on record for Subcarrier was the old, Roseland,
142

Id.

143

Id. at 731-32.

144 Id. at 732.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147

Id.

148

Id.

149 Id.
150 Id.
151
152

Id.
Id.

153 Id.
154

Id.
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New Jersey, address. 155 Therefore, Sheriff Nield submitted that address in the
list of parties entitled to notice of their right to redeem and the county clerk
mailed the notice of Subcarrier's redemption right to Subcarrier's old, Roseland,
New Jersey address. 156 The notice of the right to redeem sent to Subcarrier was
returned stamped "[u]ndeliverable, [florwarding order expired.,' 157 In January
right to redeem was published pursuant to West Virginia
2001, the notice of
58
11A-3-22.1
Code §
On or about April 12, 2001, Sheriff Nield assigned the tax lien he had
purchased to himself, his son Ronald Nield, and John B. Lusk. 159 On the same
date, the county clerk issued a tax deed for the property naming Sheriff Nield,
Ronald Nield, and John B. Lusk as the grantees.160 Also on that day, Sheriff
Nield went to the property and observed a sign attached to a fence surrounding
the telecommunications tower of Subcarrier located on the property which displayed Subcarrier's name, current address, and phone number. 16' Furthermore,
the circuit court found that it was undisputed that the sign had been present on
Subcarrier
the property since at least August 1999.162 Sheriff Nield then
63 called
and informed it that he possessed a tax deed to the property.
155

158

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159

Id.

16o

Id.

161

Id.

156
157

/

Id. In Subcarrier,it was argued at the circuit court level, among other arguments proffered
by Subcarrier, that Sheriff Nield failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the address of
Subcarrier by failing to view the property prior to the issuance of the tax deed. It was asserted that
the duty to take a view is a well-established step in the due diligence process in West Virginia,
and that Sheriff Nield knew that there was a telecommunications tower installed on the property
many months prior to the issuance of the tax deed; however, he made no effort to investigate the
tower or view the property until the day the tax deed was issued. On that day, Sheriff Nield discovered the sign on the fence surrounding the property displaying Subcarrier's contact information; a sign that had been in place at the entrance to the property since well before the sheriffs
sale and the subsequent issuance of the tax deed. However, it was asserted that he failed or neglected to view and inspect the property prior to acquiring the same by the tax deed, and therefore,
he and his assignees were deemed to have had constructive knowledge of Subcarrier's correct
address because it would have been easily discoverable and ascertainable had he inspected the
property. Id. at 731-33.
Syllabus Point 4 of PocahontasTanning Co. v. St.Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co., 60 S.E. 890
(W. Va. 1908), provides as follows: "[i]f one has knowledge or information of facts sufficient to
put a prudent man on inquiry, as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that which
he is about to purchase, he is bound to prosecute the same, and to ascertain the extent of such prior
right; and, if he wholly neglects to make inquiry, or, having begun it, fails to prosecute it in reasonable manner, the law will charge him with knowledge of all facts that such inquiry would have
afforded." Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
163 Subcarrier, 624 S.E.2d at 732.
162
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In July 2001, Sheriff Nield, Ronald Nield, and John B. Lusk conveyed
the property to LN & N Investments, LLC ("LN & N").' 64 Sheriff Nield, Ronald Nield, and John B. Lusk were the sole principals of LN & N. 165 In September 2002, Subcarrier filed suit to set aside the tax deed. 166 In June 2003, Subcarrier filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no question
of fact that the defendants had failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining Subcarrier's correct address for providing notice of the right to redeem, and further
asserting that the tax deed was voidable as a matter of law pursuant to West
Virginia Code Section 11A-3-6(a), which prohibits sheriffs from purchasing tax
liens. 67 The circuit court denied the motion, finding that there was a genuine
question of material fact outstanding on the issue of whether the defendants had
exercised due diligence. 168 The circuit court additionally found that the issue of
whether Sheriff Nield was prohibited from purchasing the tax lien was a question of first impression in West Virginia, and held in abeyance its ruling regarding whether the tax lien purchased
by Sheriff Nield, and the tax deed issued
169
pursuant thereto, were voidable.
The case was further developed over the next year and Subcarrier renewed its motion for summary judgment in July 2004.170 By an order entered in
October 2004, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Subcarrier based upon its finding that there was no question that the defendants had
failed to make a reasonable inquiry that could have and would have revealed the
correct mailing address for the notice requirements
set forth in West Virginia
72
17
appealed.
defendants
The
'
11A-3-22.
Code §
On appeal, the court skirted the whole issue concerning the adequacy of
the defendants' attempt to exercise due diligence in determining Subcarrier's
correct address and notifying it of its right to redeem. It acknowledged the defendants' argument that
the sole issue before this court is whether the circuit court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of Subcarrier based
upon its determination that the defendants failed to make a reasonable inquiry to discover Subcarrier's correct mailing address

164

Id.

165

Id.

166 Id.
167

Id. at 733.

168 Id.
169 Id.
170

Id.

171

Id.
Id.

172
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for the
notice requirements set forth in W. Va. Code § 1 1A-373
22.

However, the court then stated that it "need not reach the issue raised by
the defendants, . . . as we find that summary judgment was proper on grounds
other than those asserted by the circuit court[,]" and affirmed174 summary judgment on a basis different from that utilized by the circuit court.
The court framed the dispositive issue as "the question of whether Sheriff Nield was prohibited by W. Va. Code § 11A-3-6(a) from purchasing a tax
lien or receiving a tax deed."'' 75 In answering what it declared to be the dispositive question, the court looked to West Virginia Code § 11A-3-6(a) which stated
as follows:
No sheriff, clerk of the county commission or circuit court, assessor, nor deputy of any of them, shall directly or indirectly
become the purchaser, or be interested in the purchase, of any
tax lien on any real estate at the tax sale or receive any tax deed
conveying such real estate. Any such officer so purchasing
shall forfeit one thousand dollars for each offense. The sale of
any tax lien on any real estate, or the conveyance of such real
estate by tax deed, to one of the officers named in this section
shall be voidable, at the instance of any person having the right
to redeem, until
such real estate reaches the hands of a bona fide
76
purchaser. 1
The court next stated that it found nothing ambiguous about the statute's
prohibition against sheriffs purchasing tax liens or receiving tax deeds.1 77 "Under the plain language of W. Va. Code § 1lA-3-6(a), '[n]o sheriff,' may purchase a tax lien or receive a tax deed."'' 78 Sheriff Nield and his compatriots argued that when West Virginia Code § 11A-3-6(a) was read in the context of the
other sections comprising Article 3 of Chapter 11A, it was clear that the Legislature intended to prohibit from purchasing a tax lien or receiving a tax deed
only the sheriff of the county in which the tax-sale was being conducted.1 79 The
court concurred that it was proper to consider West Virginia Code § 1 1A-3-6(a)
in light of its surrounding statutes, but disagreed with the defendants' position
that such a reading led to the conclusion that "[n]o sheriff," as used in West
173

Id. at 734.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1 1A-3-6(a) (1994)) (emphasis removed).

177

Id.

178

Id. at 735.

179

Id.
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Virginia Code § 1 1A-3-6(a), was actually a reference to only the sheriff of a
particular county, and proceeded to review the surrounding statutes relating to
sheriffs in Article 3.'80 The conclusion from this review was that "W. Va. Code
§ 11A-3-6(a) is plain in stating that 'No sheriff,... shall directly or indirectly
become the purchaser, or be interested in the purchase, of any tax lien on any
real estate at the tax sale or receive any tax deed conveying such real estate.'
There is nothing in this statute to limit its prohibition to only the sheriff conducting the tax sale. '' 1 8 As a result, the court held that Sheriff Nield was prohibited from being a purchaser of a tax lien or receiving a tax deed, regardless of
and purchased a tax lien at a
the fact that he was the Sheriff of Mineral County
82
sale conducted by the Sheriff of Preston County.'
In anticipation of this holding, the defendants further asserted that because the property had been sold to LN & N, the deed was no longer voidable
and that that LN & N was a bona fide purchaser. 183 This argument was supported by the last provision of West Virginia Code § 1 A-3-6(a), which states:
The sale of any tax lien on any real estate, or the conveyance of
such real estate by tax deed, to one of the officers named in this
section shall be voidable, at the instance of any person having
the right to redeem, until
such real estate reaches the hands of a
84
bona fide purchaser.1
In response to this assertion, the court initially noted that the statute did
not define the term bona fide purchaser. 85 As a result, the court looked to
precedent to ascertain a definition.1 86 The court noted that "'[a] bona fide purchaser is one who actually purchases in good faith.""0 87 It also recognized that it
had previously described a bona fide purchaser as "'one who purchases for a
valuable consideration, paid or parted with, without notice of any suspicious
circumstances to put him upon inquiry.' 1 88 Based on these definitions, the
court stated that
[i]n the instant case, we are presented with the unusual circumstance of a person who, by virtue of his position as sheriff, is
prohibited by law from purchasing tax liens or receiving tax
180

Id.

181

Id. at 737.

182

Id.

183

Id.

194 Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1 A-3-6(a)).
185 Id. at 737.
186

Id.

187

Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Kyger v. Depue, 6 W. Va. 288 (1873)).

188

Id. (quoting Stickley v. Thorn, 106 S.E. 240, 242 (W. Va. 1921)).
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deeds. The question we must answer is whether a corporation
may hold such a deed as a bona fide purchaser when the sheriff
is a principal of the corporation. Given the foregoing definitions of a bona fide purchaser, we find that such a corporation
may not enjoy bona fide purchaser status. It would defy logic
and justice to allow a sheriff to own, as the principal of a corporation, that which he is prohibited by law from owning....
Accordingly, we now hold that where a sheriff is among the
principals of a corporation, the corporation cannot, for purposes
of W. Va. Code § 11A-3-6(a), be deemed a bona fide purchaser
1 89
of real estate that has been acquired by virtue of a tax deed.
F.

Cogar v. Lafferty

Cogar v. Lafferty19 0 was the next case handed down by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Syllabus Points 4 and 5 of such decision
sum up its precedential value quite well and obviate the need for a lengthy discussion.
Syllabus Point 4 provides that "[p]artners in a West Virginia general
partnership as defined by W. Va. Code § 47B-1-1 (2003) are not coowners of
partnership property and have no interest in partnership property that entitles
them to separate notice of the right to redeem partnership property that has been
sold for delinquent taxes."' 91
Syllabus Point 5 provides that "[w]hen property owned by a West Virginia general partnership is sold for delinquent taxes, it is only necessary to
as set forth in W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19
serve notice of the right to redeem
92
(1998) upon the partnership."1
G.

Plemons v. Gale

Plemons v. Gale,193 while not a state court decision, is probably the decision with the most significance since Lilly v. Duke. 194 It has spawned four (4)
separate, published opinions and drawn some parameters around the focus of
determining whether or not a tax lien purchaser exercised reasonable diligence
in attempting to apprise an interested party of its right of redemption prior to the
issuance of a tax deed.
189

Id. at 737-38.

190 639 S.E.2d 835 (W. Va. 2006).
191 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
192

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5

193 298 F.Supp.2d 380 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), vacated, 396 F.3d 569, remanded to 382 F.Supp.2d
826 (S.D.W. Va. 2005).
194 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988); see also supra notes 62- 67 and accompanying text.
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In its initial permutation, Plemons v. Gale195 commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. In assessing the
landscape, the court noted at the outset that
[f]or the court to set aside the defendants' tax sale deed, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendants failed to provide her
with adequate notice of their intent to acquire the deed to the
property. The procedure for giving notice set forth in the West
Virginia Code requires, at 196
bare minimum, that the notice given
process.
due
with
comport
Plemons and her business partner, Jerry Lipscomb, purchased the property in 1999.197 Plemons refinanced the debt secured by the property in February 2000.198 After the refinancing, Plemons believed that the bank was paying
the real estate taxes on the property through an escrow account. 199 However,
she was mistaken, and neither she nor the bank paid the real estate taxes subsequent to the refinancing. 2 °° As a result, on November 13, 2000, the Kanawha
County Sheriff sold the tax lien encumbering the property to Advantage 99 TD
("Advantage"). °1
After acquiring the tax lien, Advantage conducted a title examination
that revealed the identities of parties having an interest in the property.0 2 Advantage then tendered a report to the county clerk identifying those parties to be
notified of their redemption right and requesting that the clerk prepare and serve
notice on such parties. 0 3 The report prepared by Advantage named both Plemons and her business partner, Jerry Lipscomb, among others, as parties entitled
to notice.2 °4 The report provided three (3) alternative addresses for Plemons. 5°
On January 16, 2002, the clerk issued a notice to redeem to the listed
parties. 2 06 The notice stated that the tax lien encumbering the property had been
sold to Advantage and that a deed would be issued to Advantage unless a party

195

298 F.Supp.2d 380. The case was removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
197

Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.

198

Id.

196

199 Id.
200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id.

206

Id.
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redeemed the taxes. 2 7 The notices were sent to the parties at the addresses
listed in Advantage's report by certified mail, return receipt requested.2 8° Plemons had resided at the property from August 1999 to May 2001, and from July
2001 to June 2003, she had rented the property to tenants. 20 9 At the time the
to redeem in January 2002, Plemons lived at another
clerk mailed the notice
210

*address in Charleston.

All notices sent to the address of 913 Echo Road were returned by the
post office stamped "No Such Number.",21' The notices sent to Plemons and
Lipscomb at 917 Echo Road, the property address, were returned by the post
office stamped "Not Deliverable as Addressed Unable to Forward., 21 2 The tenants of the property did not receive or claim the notices sent to "Occupant" at
917 Echo Road, and the notices sent to "Occupant" were eventually returned by
the post office.213 The notice sent to Plemons at 928 Garden Street was returned
stamped as unclaimed and refused.214 None of the notices sent to Plemons,
Lipscomb, or the occupants of the property resulted in a signed acknowledgment of receipt, and all of the notices were eventually returned unclaimed. 21 5 Of
significance, especially in light of the results that yielded upon appeal to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, is the fact that the decision omits any discussion of whether notice was sent to the bank holding the property as collateral.
After the notices were returned to the clerk, Advantage published the
notice in the Charleston Gazette and the Charleston Daily Mail on two separate
dates.216 When no party redeemed the taxes constituting a lien on the property
by the close of the redemption period, the clerk issued a deed to Advantage and
Advantage recorded the deed.217 On November 22, 2002, Advantage conveyed
the property to Douglas Q. Gale by a quitclaim deed which he recorded.218
Plemons stated in an affidavit that she had not seen the published notice,
party. 219
and that she was not made aware of the published notice by any other
Further, Plemons stated that she first learned that the property had been sold for
taxes in January 2003.220 Throughout the notice period, Plemons had been listed
207

Id.

208
209

Id.
Id.

210

Id.

211

Id.

212

Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383.

213

214
215

Id.
Id.

217

Id.
Id.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id.

216
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in the Kanawha-Putnam telephone directory under "Linda and Michael Buechler. 22' In addition, the property's tenants knew the whereabouts of Plemons.222
Furthermore, Plemons had continued to make the regularly scheduled mortgage
payments to the bank.223
In assessing Plemon's motion for summary judgment, the court focused
on whether Advantage provided Plemons with adequate notice of her right to
redeem by addressing the issue in three parts.224 First, the court reviewed West
Virginia's statutory scheme for tax-sales.22 5 Second, the court discussed the
requirements of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.2 26
Third, the court applied the notice requirements of due process to the situation
in which a mailed notice is returned unclaimed.227
In discussing West Virginia's statutory scheme for tax-sales, the court
noted that the amended versions of Articles 3 and 4 of Chapter 1lA of the West
Virginia Code place the burden of providing constitutionally adequate notice on
the tax lien purchaser.228 In discussing the list in relation to a notice to redeem
required by West Virginia Code § 11-3-19, the court noted that
[t]he form list submitted by purchasers to the clerk for the purpose of complying with § 11A-3-19 requires purchasers to provide the addresses of the persons on the list. Thus, tax lien purchasers are responsible for identifying and locating parties holding an interest in the property and for ensuring that the clerk
mails proper notice to those parties. 2 9
The court then noted that West Virginia Code § 1 1A-3-22 "makes clear
that tax lien purchasers must exercise due diligence in identifying and locating
parties entitled to notice and that constructive notice is only permissible following the exercise of due diligence. 23 °
In focusing on the application of the statutory scheme to the facts in
play, the court stated that it was undisputed that Plemons had a right to receive
notice of her right to redeem and that Plemons did not acquire actual knowledge
that such notice was sent until after the conclusion of the redemption period.231
221

Id.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224
225

Id.
Id.

226

Id. at 384.

227
228

Id.
Id.

229

Id. at 385.

230

Id.

231

Id.
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The court also commented that in order to prevail, Plemons had to satisfy the
substantive standard for setting aside a tax-sale deed set forth in West Virginia
Code § 11 A-4-4(b), which requires a plaintiff to prove "'by clear and convincing evidence that [the tax lien purchaser] failed to exercise reasonably diligent
efforts to provide notice' to the plaintiff of its intention to acquire the tax-sale
deed., 23 2 With this basis, the court found that West Virginia Code § 1 1A-4-4(b)
"allows a plaintiff to set aside a tax sale deed when she proves by clear and convincing evidence that the tax lien purchaser failed to give constitutionally adequate notice. ,,233 However, the court also expressly stated that,
[iun so finding, the court expresses no opinion as to the propriety of either placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff or requiring that the plaintiff prove failure to give constitutionally
adequate notice by clear and convincing evidence. Resolution
of these burden of proof issues would require the court to address "questions of a constitutional nature" which are not "necessary to a decision of the case. ' 2 4
Next, the court turned to a discussion of the requirements of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.235 The conclusion resulting from such discussion was that due processrequires property owners to be given adequate notice of their redemption right
prior to the issuance of the tax-sale deed.23 6
Finally, the court focused its efforts on defining what constituted adequate notice within the context of the case at hand.237 After considering the due
2 38
process standard set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,239 the court noted that the due process standard articulated in Mullane and Mennonite focuses the due process inquiry on the actions taken by the party responsible for giving notice. 24° That
party must make a reasonably diligent effort to ascertain those entitled to notice
and must take steps reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. 4 1 The court
then articulated one of the most poignant comments to appear in any of the decisions related to tax-sale jurisprudence:
232

Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1 IA-4-4(b) (1994)).

233

Id. at 385-86.

234

Id. at 386.

235

Id.

236

Id.

237

239

Id. at 387.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
462 U.S. 791 (1983).

240

Plemons, 298 F.Supp.2d at 387.

241

Id. at 388.

238
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Under West Virginia law, the tax lien purchaser has the duty to
give notice and a countervailing interest in profiting from a
property owner's failure to redeem. That is, a tax lien purchaser
is unlikely to want a property owner to receive actual notice of
her right to redeem as he hopes to make money on his purchase.
This circumstance makes it imperative that courts strictly scrutinize efforts of a tax lien purchaser to ensure that they are
"such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee" might
242
reasonably adopt.
With the parameters drawn, the court then stated that Advantage had
properly identified Plemons as an interested party entitled to notice of her right
of redemption and requested that the clerk mail her notice to three separate addresses, including the mailing address of the property, the address for the property listed on the deed, and the address of a rental property owned by Plemons. 243 The court also noted that the notices sent to Plemons were returned
unclaimed by the post office and that she had failed to return any of the signed
acknowledgments of receipt.244 Again, no reference was made as to whether the
bank involved had received any notice.
Armed with these facts, the court next recognized that courts across the
country faced with similar issues had found that, when notice sent by certified
mail is returned unclaimed, the reasonable diligence standard requires the party
charged with providing notice to make further inquiry to ascertain the intended
recipient's proper address.24 5 The court stated that
[s]imply put, the requirements of due process are not satisfied
by the mere act of mailing notice to any address. Due process
requires that a reasonably diligent effort be made to mail the notice to the intended recipient's correct mailing address. When
notice is sent via certified mail and returned unclaimed, the
sender has positive knowledge that he sent the notice to the
wrong address and that the mailing failed to convey actual notice to the intended recipient. If a reasonably diligent party
wanted to provide actual notice and learned that notice sent by
mail was returned unclaimed, the party's next logical step
would not be to publish a relatively small announcement in the
newspaper. Rather, a reasonably diligent party would make further inquiry in hopes of finding the intended recipient's correct
address. Requiring a party to make further inquiry is particu242

Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)).

243

Id.
Id.

244

245 Id.
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larly importantwhen the one charged with the duty to give notice would benefit from the failure of the intended recipient to
receive actualnotice. Therefore, the court FINDS that when notice sent by certified mail is returned unclaimed, the reasonable
diligence standard requires the party charged with giving notice
to undertake further inquiry reasonably calculated to ascertain
the intended recipient's correct mailing address. 246
As examples, the court articulated the following:
If the party charged with notice is a state office, the office may
be required to check any records it has pertaining to the subject
property or the intended recipient for the correct address. If the
intended recipient is a large corporation, inquiry to the secretary
of state would likely be one of many ways in which a party
could satisfy its obligation of further inquiry. If the last known
address is an address other than the subject property and service
on this address fails, a party giving notice could make further
inquiry at the subject property or with neighbors adjacent to the
subject property. If notice mailed to one person fails, further
inquiry could be made with others holding an interest in the
property, such as mortgagees. Where, as here, the intended recipient is a private person, further inquiry could be made by
calling the telephone number listed for the private person in the
directory for the area in which the subject property is located.
As these examples indicate, extraordinary measures are not necessary, and no single method of inquiry is either required or
sufficient in every case. Reasonable diligence requires the sort
of further inquiry that would be undertaken by a person of ordinary prudence desirous of locating the intended recipient's correct address.24 7
As a result, the court declared that when all of the notices sent to Plemons were returned unclaimed, Advantage knew that she had not received actual notice of the pending tax-sale.24 8 At that point, the court concluded that the
reasonable diligence standard required Advantage to make further inquiry reasonably calculated to locate Plemons's correct address.249 It stated that Advan-

tage could have ascertained Plemons's correct address through a number of different means; it could have simply called Plemons on the telephone since she

247

Id. at 389 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. (internal citations omitted).

248

Id.

249

Id.

246
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was listed in the local telephone directory throughout the notice period, it could
have asked the tenants living at the subject property for help locating Plemons,
and it could have made inquiry to others holding an interest in the property, such
as Plemons's mortgagee.2 50 However, the court noted, it need not determine
whether any of these actions individually would have satisfied the reasonable
diligence standard, because after the mailing notice was returned unclaimed,
Advantage took none of the exampled actions and made no further inquiry prior
to publishing notice.251
Gale appealed the district court's decision. On appeal, the circuit court
stated its focus as follows:
The question before us is what efforts must be made by a party
charged with giving notice of irrevocable loss of property via a
tax sale, when it is, or should be, apparent from the initial mailings' prompt return that they have failed to provide any notice
to the intended recipient.252
In answering this question, the circuit court stated that
[a]dopting the rule that prompt return of mailed notice triggers a
duty to make reasonable follow-up efforts would seem to best
comport with the instruction in Mullane that due process requires efforts 'reasonably calculated' to actually 'apprise interested parties' of the possible deprivation; that is, notice consistent with that of 'one desirous of actually informing253the absentee,' rather than efforts that are but a 'mere gesture.'
Furthermore, "when prompt return of an initial mailing makes clear that
the original effort at notice has failed, the party charged with notice must make
reasonable efforts to learn the correct address before constructive notice will be
deemed sufficient. ' 254 However, the circuit court also noted that a tax sale need
not be set aside in every case in which initial attempts at mailed notice have
failed and no further mailed notice is sent; recognizing that there may be in255
stances when reasonable follow-up efforts would yield no different address.
That is, the circuit court stated a rule mandating follow-up efforts, but then
carved out an exception where the follow-up efforts would be an exercise in
futility.
250
251
252

Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir. 2005).

Id. at 575 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950)).
2
1d. at 576.
255
Id. at 577.
253
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In applying these standards, the circuit court first looked to the several
possible follow-up efforts enumerated by the district court.256 In relation to the
district court's discussion of the fact that Advantage could have consulted the
telephone directory, questioned the tenants of the property, or made inquiries of
the secured bank in attempting to ascertain Plemons's address as examples of
follow-up steps, the circuit court stated that it did not agree that reasonable follow-up compelled such efforts in the circumstances of the case.25 7 It reasoned
that checking the local telephone directory may be reasonable in a given situation, but that in the case at hand it would have been an exercise in futility because at the time the notices were sent out as well as when they were returned,
Plemons was not reachable at the number or address listed in the current directory, and calls to that number were no longer being forwarded to her mobile
phone. 258 Furthermore, the circuit court found that reaching out to the tenants of
the property seemed an unreasonable burden on the basis that the notice sent to
the occupants at the property's mailing address was returned as undeliverable.25 9
In addition, the circuit court also concluded that reasonable efforts did not require contacting Plemons's secured lender on the basis that there was no evidence that Plemons enjoyed a special relationship with the bank such that attempting to enlist its help would have led to the discovery of her correct location. 260
It is submitted that while the use of the telephone directory might have
been an exercise in futility, the circuit court's rationale in relation to using the
tenants and the bank as conduits to locating Plemons would not have been exercises in futility and were not unreasonably burdensome tasks. First, in relation
to contacting the tenants, existing law mandates that a bona fide purchaser in
any other transaction go through just such an effort before such purchaser can be
protected. 261 A purchaser, to be protected as a bona fide purchaser, is charged
with such notice as an inspection of the property and inquiry of its occupants
might reveal.262 Why should a tax lien purchaser not carry an identical obligation? In a sheriffs sale scenario, the tax lien purchaser has more than twelve
(12) months between the date of the purchase of the tax lien and the date that the
West Virginia Code § 1 lA-3-19(a) list or schedule must be submitted to the
county clerk.263 What is unreasonably burdensome about requiring the tax lien
purchaser to visit the property during that twelve (12) month period to ascertain
the location or whereabouts of the owner when purchasers in the ordinary
256

Id.

257

262

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 162.
Supra note 162.

263

W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-19(a) (1998).

258
259
260

261
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course carry such burden? Especially when the tax lien purchaser is not paying
a negotiated consideration that the owner is actually receiving and benefiting
from, but hoisting the property from its owner through a state-sponsored mechanism at a fraction of its true value. Furthermore, such an argument was
made to the Circuit Court of Preston County during the course of Subcarrier,
and not dismissed by the circuit court in that instance.2 6 Also, the Supreme
Court at least gave some lip service to the idea that such an obligation may exist
when it noted in its discussion of the facts underlying Subcarrier that Sheriff
Nield inspected the property on the date that he received his tax deed and found
the property posted with a 26sign
identifying Subcarrier as the owner and provid5
ing its contact information.
Second, the secured bank was a party entitled to notice of its right to redeem, although none of the Plemons decisions address this issue. The property
stood as the bank's security for the repayment of Plemons' s loan from the bank.
The potential loss of such security through a tax-sale, which would essentially
render the loan unsecured, would have given the bank sufficient inducement to
have provided Plemons's correct address or at least to have passed along to her
the prospect that the property was potentially subject to forfeiture. The bank
most-assuredly could have been located and contacted with relative ease. The
invocation of a "special relationship" analysis seems more like an attempt to
justify a conclusion than a path to be reviewed on the way to the conclusion.
Furthermore, the invocation of such analysis runs contrary to the precedent established in Lilly v. Duke,26 6 where it was stated that:
In the present case, we believe the plaintiffs' name and address
were reasonably ascertainable. While the address did not appear on the face of the deed of trust, a handwritten notation in
the margin thereof did provide an address. Furthermore, other
identifying information was reasonably available. The deed of
trust specifically named Walton S. Shepherd, Il, a resident of
Kanawha County, as trustee and notice could have been mailed
to him in that capacity. The deed of trust also stated that note
payments were to be remitted to the Bank of Sissonville, which
was the collection agentfor the plaintiffs. A simple inquiry at
that bank
presumably would have provided the necessary ad2 67
dress.
After having dismissed the district court's examples, the circuit court
concluded that "reasonable diligence required Advantage to search all publicly
Subcarrier Communications, Inc. v. Nield, 624 S.E.2d 729, 732 (W. Va. 2005).
Id. at 731-33.
266 376 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1988); see also supra notes 62- 67 and accompanying text.
267
Lilly, 376 S.E.2d at 125-26 (emphasis added).
264

265
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available county records once the prompt return of the mailings made clear that
its initial examination of the title to the property had not netted Plemons's correct address. 268 However, it then stated that "[u]nfortunately, the record in this
case does not disclose what efforts, if any, Advantage made to search public
documents, or whether Plemons's proper address would have been ascertainable
from such a search. Thus, we must remand the case to the district court for resolution of these questions. 2 69
As a result, the case went back to the district court on remand. Applying the exercise in futility standard established by the circuit court, the district
court reversed its earlier decision and granted judgment in favor of the successor
in interest of the tax lien purchaser. 270 However, it is the remainder of the decision that is material and significant, and correct.
I have followed the instruction of the Court of Appeals as set
out above and found the facts required to answer the two inquiries it posed. Having done so, I have entered summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. Although I have disposed of this
dispute by final order in accordance with the law as announced
by the Court of Appeals, I continue this writing to express my
respectful, and, I trust, principled disagreement with certain
aspects of the Fourth Circuit'sopinion.
I am puzzled by each of the two inquiries I was ordered to consider upon remand. First, I am unable to understand why the
Court of Appeals believes that a re-examination of the public
records is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Second, I am confused as to how the result of any follow-up examination of the public records would be relevant to a due
process analysis.
When the initial notices were returned as undeliverable, Advantage knew that Ms. Plemons had not received actual notice and
that her property rights would be extinguished by the impending
issuance of the tax deed. In the original summary judgment order, I held that once Advantage knew that Ms. Plemons had not
received the notice, due process required Advantage to undertake further inquiry to determine her whereabouts. The appeals
panel majority embraced this finding, and noted in its remand
order that '[wihen a party required to give notice knows that a
mailed notice has, for some reason, failed to inform a person
2"

Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569, 578 (4th Cir. 2005).

269

Id.

270

Plemons v. Gale, 382 F.Supp.2d 826, 827 (S.D.W. Va. 2005).
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holding a property interest of the impending deprivation, the notice does not pass constitutional muster.' The majority further
stated that this court 'properly held that the reasonable diligence
standard mandated by Mullane and its progeny required some
follow up effort here.' Instead of finding that Advantage should
have expanded its search beyond the public records, however,
the Court of Appeals concluded that 'reasonable diligence required Advantage to search all publicly available county records
once the prompt return of the mailings made clear that its initial
examination to the title of the Echo Road property had not netted Plemons' correct address.'
As the defendants explain in their pending motion for summary
judgment, they 'examined records maintained by the Clerk and
the Sheriff of Kanawha County in preparing [their] report to the
clerk.' This first title examination occurred in December, 2001,
and the defendants' initial efforts are clearly explained in the
record as it appeared before the Fourth Circuit on appeal. A reexamination of the same county records would have been a
mere gesture. As the Supreme Court noted in Mullane, 'when
notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not
due process.'
I am further puzzled by the second subject of inquiry mandated
by the Court of Appeals. I think it immaterial whether the defendants would have actually ascertained Ms. Plemons' address
upon a re-examination of the public records. I believe that the
only relevant inquiry is to ask what process would be undertaken by a reasonable person under the specific circumstances
of the case. The result obtained does not speak to the reasonableness of the method of inquiry. The question of what process
is due is distinctfrom what the process would actually reveal.
As the Supreme Court noted in Fuentes v. Shevin, '[t]o one who
protests against the taking of his property without due process
of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due
process would have led to the same result. ..

Under West Virginia law, this due process inquiry creates a
conflict of interest because the party charged with providing
this constitutionally required notice is also the tax lien purchaser, who has a countervailing interest in profiting from a
property owner's failure to redeem. This conflict of interest
makes it imperative that courts strictly scrutinize the efforts of a
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/7
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tax lien purchaserto ensure that they are 'such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee' might reasonablyadopt.
Instead of re-examining the public records and retracing its earlier, fruitless steps, I respectfully assert that Advantage reasonably could have employed several simple, inexpensive and efficient means to determine Ms. Plemons' proper address. I suggested, in my prior order, that Advantage could have simply
called Ms. Plemons on the telephone, as she was listed in the
local telephone directory throughout the notice period. Advantage could have asked the tenants living at the subject property
for help locating Ms. Plemons. Finally, I noted that Advantage
could have made inquiry to others holding an interest in the
property, such as Ms. Plemons' mortgagee.
In my prior opinion, I ultimately found it unnecessary to reach
the question of whether Advantage acted reasonably because after the mailed notice was returned unclaimed, Advantage took
no action. Advantage made no further inquiry prior to publishing notice. Inaction in the face of a constitutional requirement
of reasonably diligent efforts could not, I thought, satisfy the
requirements of due process.
According to Mullane, Mennonite, and the balancing tests set
out in well known cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge, due process offers flexible protection that must be tailored to the circumstances of each case. In addition to being fact-specific, I think
of due process as necessarily contemporary in nature. As Justice Frankfurter noted:
'Due Process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just
treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history
and civilization, 'due process' cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula.... Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process.
It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those
whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009
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In the 'time, place, and circumstances' of this case, one who actually wanted to inform Ms. Plemons that her house was to be
conveyed because of a failure to pay roughly $3,000 in taxes
andfees would not have looked for her in the dusty corners of
the Kanawha County record room. In the age of telephones, internet search engines, online newspapers, online peoplefinders, and readily available credit reports, most people can
easily find someone. Thus, if a reasonable person were
charged with the duty of locating Ms. Plemons in the relatively
small city of Charleston, West Virginia, it is my belief that he
would be likely to employ 'Google' to find her name, call information to learn her telephone number, contact her lending
bank, or call her ex-husband. Instead, Advantage searched the
public records for Ms. Plemons' address and mailed written notices to two of the addresses contained therein. When the notices were found to be undeliverable, Advantage did nothing
further. I continue to believe that those efforts failed to meet
the constitutional standards of due process. 2 7 1
This "dissent" by Justice Goodwin, in my opinion, is well-placed, wellfounded, and in accordance with the manner in which the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia would have resolved the matter had it not been removed as a result of diversity jurisdiction.
H.

Jones v. Flowers

Jones v. Flowers272 was a 2006 decision of the United States Supreme
Court. In 1967, Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas.273 He lived in the house with his wife until they separated
in 1993.274 Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife continued to live in the house.275 Jones paid his mortgage each month for thirty
years, and the mortgage company paid Jones' property taxes. After Jones paid
off his mortgage in 1997,
the property taxes went unpaid, and the property was
276
certified as delinquent.

271

Id. at 828-31 (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

272

547 U.S. 220 (2006).
Id.

273
274

275
276

Id.
Id.
Id.
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In April, 2000, the commissioner of state lands ("Commissioner") attempted to notify Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address.277
The packet of information stated that unless Jones redeemed the
property, it would be subject to public sale two years later on
April 17, 2002. Nobody was home to sign for the letter, and
nobody appeared at the post office to retrieve the letter within
the next fifteen days. The post office returned 27the
unopened
8
packet to the Commissioner marked 'unclaimed.'
"Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette.
No bids were submitted, which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of
the property.', 279 Several months later, Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. 280 ' The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones at the North
Bryan Street address, attempting to notify him that his house would be sold to
Flowers if he did not pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also
returned to the Commissioner marked 'unclaimed.' 28' Flowers purchased the
house.282 "Immediately after the 30-day period for post-sale redemption passed,
Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. The notice
was served
on Jones' daughter, who contacted Jones and notified him of the tax283
sale.

Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner's failure
to provide notice of the tax-sale and of Jones' right to redeem
resulted in the taking of his property without due process. The
Commissioner and Flowers moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the two unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally adequate attempt at notice, and
Jones filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 84
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and
Flowers, concluding that the Arkansas tax-sale statute, which set forth the notice
277

Id.

278

Id. at 223-24.

279

Id. at 224.

280

Id.

281

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.

282
283
284
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procedure followed by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due
process requirements.285
"Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment. ' ' 286 Jones appealed again. 2 " The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and held that when mailed notice of a tax-sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to
provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so, and reversed the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.288 In
laying out its analysis, the court opened with the following statement:
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a
house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent
to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner
prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers,
handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters down a
storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner's office to prepare a new stack of letters and send
them again. No one 'desirous of actually informing' the
owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared and say 'I tried.' Failure to follow up would be
unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the postman.
By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is
practicable to do so. This is especially true when, as here,
the subject matter of the letter concerns such an important
and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Although
the State may have made a reasonable calculation of how to
reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the notice
was returned that Jones was 'no better off than if the notice
had never been sent.' Deciding to take no further action is
not what someone 'desirous of actually informing' Jones

28'
286
M
288

Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225.
id.
Id.
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would do; such a person would take further reasonable steps
if any were available. 89
The Court then turned to the three arguments of the Commissioner as to
why reasonable follow-up measures were not required under the circumstances. 290 First, the Commissioner asserted that the notice was sent to an address that Jones had provided and that he had a legal obligation to keep updated.291 This is strikingly akin to an argument I have heard numerous times in
state court actions from the parties attempting to uphold the validity of a tax
deed. In response, the Court noted that the Commissioner had not argued that
Jones' failure to comply with his statutory obligation to keep his address updated had forfeited his right to constitutionally sufficient notice and it agreed. 2
The Court then stated that while mailing notice to the address that Jones had last
provided gave strong support for the contention that the Commissioner had actually sent notice reasonably calculated to reach Jones, that fact alone did not
alter the requirement that the Commissioner should have taken follow-up efforts
when the notice was promptly returned "unclaimed. 2 9 3
Second, the Commissioner asserted that "after failing to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a property holder is on inquiry-notice that
his property is subject to governmental taking. 294 Again, this is also an argument that I have seen raised on more than one occasion by parties attempting to
uphold the validity of a tax deed. In response to this assertion, the Court stated
that "the common knowledge that property may become subject to government
taking when taxes are not paid does not excuse the government from complying
with its constitutional obligation of notice before taking private property. 295 In
addition, the Court noted that it had previously "stated the opposite: An interested party's 'knowledge of delinquency296in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.'
Third, the Commissioner argued that "Jones was obliged to ensure that
those in whose hands he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy. 297 The Court likewise dismissed this argument out-of-hand.2 98
As a result, the Court found that "the State should have taken additional
reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do So. 29 9 The question be289
290
291
292
293

Id. at 229-30 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 231.

Id.
Id. at 232.
Id.

295

id. at 231-32.
Id. at 232.

296

Id. at 232-33.

297

Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.

294

298
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came, were there any such available steps. 3° In relation to such question, the
Court first noted that "if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be
faulted for doing nothing., 30 1 Second, it noted that "there were several reasonable steps the State could have taken[; and w]hat steps are reasonable in re30 2
sponse to new information depends upon what the new information reveals.
In outlining possible follow-up steps, the Court declared that:
One reasonable step primarily addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail,
so that a signature was not required... . Following up with
regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice to
Jones if-as it turned out-he had moved. Even occupants who
ignored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owner (if any
had been left) might scrawl the owner's new address on the notice packet and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify
Jones directly.
Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the possibility
that Jones had moved as well as that he had simply not retrieved
the certified letter, would have been to post notice on the front
door, or to address otherwise undeliverable mail to 'occupant.'
Most States that explicitly outline additional procedures in their
tax sale statutes require just such steps. Either approach would
increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified that he
was about to lose his property, given the failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person. That is clear in the case
of an owner who still resided at the premises. It is also true in
the case of an owner who has moved: Occupants who might
disregard a certified mail slip not addressed to them are less
likely to ignore posted notice, and a letter addressed to them
(even as 'occupant') might be opened and read. In either case,
there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the owner,
if only because a change in ownership could well affect their
own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of the State's effort
to sell his house when he was alerted by one of the occupantshis daughter-after she was served with an unlawful detainer
notice.

299

Id. at 234.

300

id.

301

Id.

302

Id.
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Jones believes that the Commissioner should have searched
for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook and other
government records such as income tax rolls. We do not
believe the government was required to go this far. As the
Commissioner points out, the return of Jones' mail marked
'unclaimed' did not necessarily mean that 717 North Bryan
Street was an incorrect address; it merely informed the
Commissioner that no one appeared to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it would be returned to
the sender. An open-ended search for a new addressespecially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his
address updated with the tax collector, imposes burdens on
the State significantly greater than the several relatively
easy options outlined above.3 °3
In conclusion, Jones ratifies the position taken in Plemons that followup efforts are required when the initial mailing of the notice of the right to redeem is returned as undeliverable in some fashion, and even outlines examples
of what those follow-up efforts should entail.
IH. ACTIONS TO SET ASIDE TAX DEEDS: FEE-SHIFING AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

The reported results of the remand of Jones also provide for a rather interesting opportunity for the practitioner. Following the Supreme Court's decision and remand of the case to the Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Jones was
further remanded back down to the Pulaski County Circuit Court in September
2006. 3° Upon remand, Jones sought his legal fees for prosecuting the action
under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).3 °5 In relevant part, this federal
statute provides as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, . . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity
such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including at-

303

Id. at 234-36 (internal citations omitted).

304
305

Jones v. Flowers, 373 Ark. 213 (2008).
Id. at 214.
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torney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such
officer's jurisdiction. 30
42 U.S.C. § 1983, in relevant part, provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 307
The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Jones' request on the basis
that "[t]he first mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was in [Jones's] Status Report filed
on November 16, 2006. ",30 8 Jones appealed this lower court ruling, "arguing that
an action does not have to be specifically pled under § 1983 for entitlement to
attorney's fees under § 1988(b)." 3°9
The Court commenced its analysis by acknowledging that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to allow a plaintiff to obtain
relief in federal courts if he can show (1) the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and (2) that a person acting under color of state law caused the
deprivation. A court has discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees for a successful § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2000).10
Next, the Court noted that of those federal courts of appeals that had looked at
the question, most had decided "that regardless of whether a plaintiff specifically cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1988 in his original pleadings, a successful
constitutional challenge is a proceeding to enforce § 1983 within the meaning of
§ 1988.' 1 As an example, the Court cited Goss v. City of Little Rock,312 a decision in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "substance of the

306
'07
M8

309
310

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Jones, 373 Ark. at 214.

Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 215.

311

Id.

312

Id. (citing 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998)).
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action, rather than the form of the pleading, should determine the applicability
of attorney's fees under § 1988(b). 313
In response to Jones' argument for legal fees, the State of Arkansas did
not assert a direct defense or counter-argument, but rather, raised a purported
procedural defect as an indirect defense. 314 The Court brushed off this defense
and concluded with the following:
In sum, the Supreme Court held that the State violated Jones's
due process rights under the United States Constitution by failing to take additional reasonable steps to notify him before a tax
sale of his property when the initial notice was returned undelivered. Thus, Jones's action was a meritorious civil rights
claim. We are persuaded by the overwhelming federal court
precedent holding that substance prevails over form when a
party fails to specifically plead an action under § 1983. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying attorney's fees
under § 1988(b) and remand the case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.315
What Jones brings to the forefront of the discussion is a second count
that should be included in any complaint seeking to set aside or rescind a tax
deed. That is, not only can the former owner of the property purportedly "taken" or "foreclosed" through the state-sponsored and endorsed tax sale mechanism petition a court to have the tax deed set aside based upon one or more of
the several grounds found in Article 4 of Chapter 11A, he might also be able to
recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees for prosecution of the action if he is successful. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ...
A purchaser at a tax-sale who fails to exercise reasonable diligence in
apprising the owner of the "taking" and affording the owner his constitutionally
protected due process guarantees is a person who has operated under the color
313

Id.

314

Id. at 216-217.
Id. at 218.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

315

316
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of a series of statutes of the State of West Virginia who is open to liability to the
owner under § 1983. A successful prosecution of the action to have the tax deed
set aside or rescinded then opens the door to an award of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees to the prosecuting property owner.31 7 As
a result, not only should a complaint seeking to set aside or rescind a tax deed
contain a count directed toward that end, but it should also contain a separate
count asserting the liability of the tax lien purchaser under the provisions of §
1983.
The trade of purchasing tax liens at sheriffs' sales has many within its
ranks that can be termed "professionals." These "professionals" were the parties that Judge Goodwin was referencing when he so artfully noted that
[u]nder West Virginia law, the tax lien purchaser has the duty to
give notice and a countervailing interest in profiting from a
property owner's failure to redeem. That is, a tax lien purchaser
is unlikely to want a property owner to receive actual notice of

317

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988b (2000); see also Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir.
1980) (Damages are available under this section for actions found to have been violative of constitutional rights and to have caused compensable injury.); Cunningham v. City of Overland, 804
F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) (In § 1983 action, both compensatory and punitive damages are available upon proper proof; principles governing propriety of such damages are derived from common
law.); Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F.Supp 914 (E.D.L.A. 1981) (Damages are available under this
section making violation of an individual's civil rights under color of state law actionable for
actions found to have been violative of constitutional rights, which such actions are proved to
have caused compensable injury.); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) (Compensatory damages in § 1983 action may include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms,
but also such injuries as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation and mental anguish and
suffering.); id. (Punitive damages are awarded in § 1983 action to punish defendant for his or her
willful or malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.); Baltezore v. Concordia
Parish Sheriffs Dept., 767 F.2d 202, (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1065 (Punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action even without a showing of actual loss by plaintiff if the
plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated.); Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir.
1996) cert. denied 519 U.S. 1084 (Punitive damages may be awarded under § 1983 when defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or
callous indifference to federally protected rights of others.); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th
Cir. 1997) (Focus, in determining propriety of punitive damages in § 1983 action, is on intent of
defendant, and whether defendant's conduct is of sort that calls for deterrence and punishment
over and above that provided by compensatory awards.); Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d
290 (5th Cir. 1970) (Punitive damages may be imposed if defendant has acted willfully and in
gross disregard for rights of complaining party.); Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F.Supp 914 (E.D.I.A
1981) (Award of punitive damages for violations of those rights secured by this section is appropriate where the violation is willful and in gross disregard for the rights of the complaining party.); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F.Supp. 161 (D.C.N.J. 1971), supplemented 346 F.Supp. 51, affd
481 F.2d 1400 (Punitive damages should not be awarded in action brought under this section
unless there is showing that proscribed action has been constant pattern or practice of behavior of
defendants and that such practice has been willful and in gross disregard for rights of plaintiff.).
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her right
to redeem as he hopes to make money on his pur31 8
chase.
Often, at least in the author's personal experience, these "professionals" miraculously "discover" the telephone number or correct address of the property owner
soon following the recording of the tax deed, a number or address that eluded
them just several months before when providing the county clerk with a list of
parties entitled to notice to redeem. Upon finally locating the property owner,
these "professionals" also often offer to sell the property back to the "former"
owner for considerably more than the amount paid at the sheriff's sale and reject
any attempts at belated or after-the-fact redemption. 1 9 It is submitted that if
these "professionals" learn that the "former" owners cannot only prosecute an
action to set aside or rescind the tax deed, but also recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, and their legal fees in the process if they are successful,
legal fees that often act as a direct deterrence to pursuing a challenge of the taxsale process in the first instance by the "former" owner, then the efforts to actually exercise reasonable diligence in locating and notifying property owners of
their redemption rights might actually go on the rise.
The remand of Jones and its bringing into focus the fact that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 can possibly cause a shifting of which side bears the legal fees in a challenge against a tax deed, as well as the possibility of an award of compensatory
and punitive damages, also provokes the thought that federal mechanisms toward this end might not be the only unique avenue available. The other avenue
requires a digression back to the days when opinions emanating out of Charleston contained such categorizations of defendants as "really stupid defendants,"
"really mean defendants," and "really stupid defendants who could have caused
320
a great deal of harm by their actions but who actually caused minimal harm."
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.321 is the landmark
decision that recognized or acknowledged slander of title as a viable cause of
action in West Virginia, and consequently affirmed a $10,000,000.00 punitive
damages award, where the compensatory damages only amounted to
$19,000.00.322 In the decision, the Court enunciated the elements of slander of
title as being "(1) publication of (2) a false statement (3) derogatory to the plaintiffs title (4) with malice (5) causing special damages (6) as a result of diminished value in the eyes of third parties." 323 In assessing these elements and generally discussing the cause of action, the Court stated that "[a]s a general rule,
318
319

Plemons v. Gale, 298 F.Supp.2d 380, 388 (S.D. W.Va. 2004).
Although the reported decision does not reflect this, a strangely similar scenario occurred in

Subcarrier.
320 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887-88 (W. Va. 1992).
321
419 S.E.2d 870.
322
Id. at 875.
323
Id. at 879.
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courts have found that wrongfully recording an unfounded claim to the property
of another is actionable as slander of title." 324 Based on this declaration, it is
quite feasible that in the context of a tax-sale, a tax lien purchaser could very
well be guilty of slandering the title of the property owner where the tax lien
purchaser recorded a tax deed from the county clerk and the purchaser did not
exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to actually apprise the owner of his
right of redemption. In this instance, the viability of the claim from the property
owner's standpoint will most likely rise and fall on the ability to prove malice.
One of the key factors to be assessed in the determination of the existence of the requisite malice is the pattern and practice of the tax lien purchaser
in the subject and other tax-sale transactions. In specifically assessing the malice element of the cause of action of slander of title, the Court focused on the
pattern and practice of TXO:
Not only do the details of the August meeting as related by Mr.
Robinson suggest malice on the part of TXO, but the facts of
Mr. Woods' dealings with Mr. Signaigo also show unsavory
and malicious practices by TXO. When examined in the light
most favorable to the appellees, the evidence clearly shows that
TXO intentionally and maliciously recorded a quitclaim deed
that it knew to be without any basis in fact because Mr. Signaigo explicitly told TXO that he had not bought the oil and gas
on the Blevins Tract in 1958. Furthermore, the record shows
that this was not an isolated incident on TXO's part-a mere
excess of zeal by poorly supervised, low level employees-but
rather part of a pattern and practice by TXO to defraud and coerce those in positions of unequal bargaining power vis a vis
TXO's superior legal firepower.325
As noted above, many of the tax lien purchasers that show up for the
annual sheriff's sale in a given county are "professionals," many of which travel
a circuit of counties to attend sheriffs' sales in and acquire numerous properties
each year across a spectrum of counties. Examining other tax deeds received by
a tax lien purchaser and the notice to redeem lists appended to those deeds could
provide a relatively decent cross-sample of the pattern and practice of the purchaser in his efforts to exercise reasonable diligence and actually attempt to
ensure that owners receive notice of their right of redemption. That is, in the
event that it can be shown that not only did the tax lien purchaser fail to exert
any true effort to identify and notify the owner in the case at hand but that there
is also such a comparable failure on his part in most if not every instance, then a
pattern and practice within the context of TXO could emerge that could lead to
324

Id. at 880.

325

Id. at 880-81.
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prevailing on a count asserting slander of title. Put another way, if it can be
shown through pattern and practice,326 by utilizing other tax deeds that a tax lien
purchaser has obtained, that the purchaser's "countervailing interest in profiting
from a property owner's failure to redeem" outstrips his attempts to ensure that
property owners receive actual notice of their right to redeem, and thus, the purchaser has recorded a deed that is due process-challenged and effectively
"takes" or "forecloses" the property owner's interest or title, as opposed to
merely clouding it as was the case in TXO, then slander of title becomes an offensive weapon that can lead to punitive damages in an action to set aside or
rescind a tax deed.
IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this Article has established that a significant amount of
reported decisions have been issued in the past thirteen years in relation to the
topic of tax-sale jurisprudence and that the focus or drive of those decisions,
with a few noted exceptions, has been to incrementally increase the protections
afforded delinquent land owners. In addition, this Article has been an attempt to
look at those decisions from a practical standpoint to assist both the title examiner in the course of his title work and the litigator in the course of his prosecuting actions to set aside or invalidate tax-sales. Hopefully, those who read this
Article will find it as valuable a resource in those areas as they have found Professor Fisher's article entitled The
Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia:
327
Can Reasonable Minds Differ?.

326

Pattern or practice of behavior can be taken into consideration in determining the availabil-

ity of punitive damages in the context of an action prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), supplemented by 346 F. Supp. 51 (D.N.J.
1972), aftd 481 F.2d 1400 (3rd Cir. 1973).
327 John W. Fisher, 1H,98 W. VA. L. REv. 449 (1996).
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